

THE
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THE OPPONENTS OF ETERNAL VALUES.

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The two largest volumes which have been devoted to the problem of values in recent years have by chance appeared before the English public in the same week, Professor Urban's admirable book, *Valuation, Its Nature and Laws*, and my volume, *The Eternal Values*. They supplement each other completely, representing the two fundamental aspects under which the problem of values can be studied. Professor Urban's work is positivistic and the other is idealistic; the one therefore deals with the relativistic aspect of our values, the other with the values as absolute realities; the one is psychological, the other epistemological; the one analyzes and explains the facts, the other aims towards a teleological system. There is no prospect of a mastery of this most central problem of philosophical thought unless both sides of it are clearly separated, understood in their meaning and cleanly contrasted. There is no solution possible as long as only the one side is considered and the other carelessly ignored. Both the relativist and the absolutist must somehow dispose of his opponent.

To be sure the attitude of the adversaries is naturally very different. The absolutist has not the slightest intention of denying the value of the relativistic construction. On the contrary he must find in his own system fullest room for the free unfolding of the relativistic knowledge. The relativist, on the other hand, must entirely exclude the absolutistic claim from his precincts. The absolute is then nothing but an empty abstraction, an arbitrary idealization of a social demand. Even if such an abstraction proves to be useful as a crystallization point for social synergy, it remains strictly relative. The idealist accepts and appreciates accordingly the psychosociological studies of the relativist; the relativist on the other hand by principle rejects the sys-

tem of absolute values. For this reason I feel in hearty sympathy with most of that which Professor Urban proclaims. His psychological descriptions and his axiological developments seem to me helpful and true up to the point where they are presented as an ultimate philosophy. It was therefore my intention to express my interest and sympathy with the suggestive work in a review which would have shown our far-reaching agreement in all those problems which are his and which alone can be his from his psychological point of view.

But Professor Urban, evidently sharing with me the conviction that clearness demands the sharpest possible expression of the contrasts in our attitudes, as editor of this Value-number of the BULLETIN has invited me rather to emphasize more the idealistic tendency of my own book and thus to bring it into sharper relief. He proposed to me for that purpose that I answer some of the objections which have been raised against my philosophical volume. To be sure the English edition of *The Eternal Values* is already itself meant as an answer to some critical arguments which have been raised against its German predecessor, *Philosophie der Werte*. The English version is indeed by no means a mere translation. It leaves out much from the German text which the student of epistemology would easily have recognized as esoteric discussions with Windelband, Rickert, Husserl, Simmel and others, although no names are mentioned. On the other hand, it contains a large number of additions which defend my position against the arguments especially of the American reviewers of my German book.

Of course I cannot restate here the idealistic view of the problems of value. I may differ in this respect from my readers, but I certainly found the four hundred and thirty pages of my volume by far too few to give full expression to the central thought; I cannot hope suddenly to do better in a hundredth part of that space. Nor have I the slightest interest in answering with any serious arguments those stray reviews which abstain from discussing my book and which substitute for it some cheap caricature. The climax of such uncritical criticism was reached by Mr. G. E. Moore, in London, in an article which, strangely enough, has found its way into *The International Journal of Ethics*. I gladly yield to the fate which makes my philosophy to such a reviewer more or less a conglomeration of purely fantastic hypotheses. Needless to say, such a complacent method would have no more difficulty in demolishing all the metaphysical systems from Plato to Hegel. I look rather to the long series of thoughtful essays which, especially in Germany and America, have been devoted to my philosophical effort

and which, often with generous overestimation, have entered into its spirit and its work, and yet have found earnest objections.

May I begin with one argument which repeatedly took a strictly personal form and yet which has general bearing. Again and again I had to read that my philosophy is contradictory to the results of psychological analysis; and the personal flavor was given to this argument by kindly reminding me that I am professionally a psychologist and that my first books, notably my *Willenshandlung*, tore in pieces that same will for which I now claim metaphysical unity. Perhaps this finds its sharpest expression in Professor Stein's excellent book *Philosophische Strömungen der Gegenwart*, in which he devotes the chief part of the first chapter on neo-idealism to a most brilliant and interesting analysis of my book. He places me wrongly, I think, in bringing my system too near to Hegel and by this underestimating my close affiliation to Fichte. And now he says: "The most curious factor in this turning of the twentieth century toward Hegelian philosophy is the historical caprice that this renaissance of Hegel begins with such a radical psychologist as Münsterberg was in his youth, and is thus introduced by the exact experimental psychology which usually has had only a condescending smile of ridicule for all metaphysics." And again he says: "The architecture of Münsterberg's book shows a power of systematization and constructive finesse together with an energy of thought which shifts the experimental psychologist into the first rank of our scholarly metaphysicians."

Stein and all the others who have lingered at this apparent contrast ought to see that there is no contradiction in thought and not even a contradiction in my personal life. I do not feel in the least removed from the lines of the experimental psychologists since I have tried to embed my psychology into a philosophical system and I may add that there was never a time that I did not see the need of this wider perspective. I am happy to say that I even have my evidence in print. That disrespectful book of my youth, *Die Willenshandlung*, did indeed try to show a way which since that time has become a familiar road for most psychologists. It decomposed the volition into sensations and affections and utterly denied the existence of a special psychological will element. But this very book ends with the statement that nothing but sensations and feelings compose the will 'in the metaphysical reality of which there lies the deepest problem of existence.' I do not want to give the impression that in my student days when I wrote that sentence I had a metaphysical system of my own in mind; yet it was written twenty years ago essentially under the influence of

Fichte's philosophy. It clearly shows that my analysis aimed to be consistent but was unwilling to turn into a philosophical psychologism. Moreover, ten years later when I wrote my *Grundzüge der Psychologie* the teleological aspect of reality had already been brought to its most insistent expression; and yet the description of the psychological will was again essentially in the same terms in which my first book presented it.

I have no reason to withdraw anything from the results of my previous psychological analysis. More than that, just from the discussion of my opponents I see that such a radical psychological analysis is the safest way to a clear insight into the teleological character of the reality of will. That which too often stands in the way is simply a lack of consistency. Too often the will is treated in the spirit of causal analysis, and yet instead of carrying this principle of science through to the last elements, a hesitation sets in and a kind of inconsistent teleology is mixed into the psychological description. The psychologist must go to the very end until he really reaches the psychical atoms. Then he will have no difficulty in seeing that this combination of psychical elements is not at all that which he means by the will of his real life activity. Just then he will discover the teleological character of his will in its purity and will see that this real will, as alone it comes in question for our immediate life, is not at all a possible object of description and explanation but has meaning only in its unity and in its reference to purposes. Consistent psychological atomism of the will and radical teleological philosophy of the will belong most intimately together, and in going back today to the writings of the great idealists from Kant to Hegel, we instinctively feel that an element of weakness enters into their argumentation from the fact that the psychology of that time was still far from a consistent analysis of mental life as mere psychological causal phenomena.

In this sense it is no less misleading, if the timeworn objection of double bookkeeping is raised against me. The real will which comes in question as an act of meaning, agreeing and disagreeing with others, obeying or disobeying ideals, is never that phenomenon which the descriptive psychologist analyzes, because it is never a phenomenon, and therefore there are not two different entries made for it. That material which the psychologist finds lies entirely in the world of existing objects; it is a mental accompaniment of physical processes, material of awareness for a passive consciousness, in short, an object. The relation between the real will and the will of the psychologist is one of definite dependence. It is the subject of will in its immediate

reality which turns towards the logical purpose of conceiving the whole of reality and therefore also the psychophysical actions of the organism in the thought form of existing independent objects. The reality of such scientific material is thus completely dependent upon the purposive activity of the will. To assert existence for a mental experience thus means already to have given to it a certain valuation and therefore presupposes a subject whose decisions are controlled by real values. If I ignore this fundamental fact of real life and simply treat the existence of objects and their givenness as the ultimate fact of reality, then of course I must come into a conflict between object and subject which is most conveniently solved in the superficial manner of positivism. Then again objects are simply posited as the only reality and the subjective purposive act becomes itself a function or a product of the objects. In that case the idea of an absolute determination of purpose indeed becomes a fantastic illusion.

The recognition that givenness of the objects and their existence involves valuation seems to me the very first step towards a theory of values. At least that alone opens to such neo-Fichtean philosophy the possibility of coördinating the æsthetic and moral experiences with the logical one and of brushing away the prejudice that existence is a more fundamental category than, for instance, beauty. No system which begins with existence as ultimate fact can ever do justice to the autonomy of the non-logical realities. Is it really an objection if one of my critics exclaims that I demand for the beautiful creation the fullest reality and yet deny to it real existence? Its æsthetic reality is just as valid as the existence reality of the physical thing. They are coördinated autonomous fulfilments of the ideal will, but the one is never the other. In so far as the experience is beautiful it has no physical existence. Hence, it really does not touch me if Mr. Moore as the climax of his contempt denounces me as 'maintaining that colors and tones and musical notes all have volitions,' while 'there is nothing in observation to support it.' He is quite right. From the standpoint of psychological observation there is not the slightest chance of finding a psychophysical volition in the melodies and curves and colors, and he who claims to find them ignores 'observations.' And yet the only scholarly magazine devoted to æsthetics, the *Zeitschrift für Aesthetik*, begins its essay on my book with the statement that "rarely has anyone come so near to the real æsthetic experience and to the meaning of the æsthetic as Hugo Münsterberg in the æsthetic part of his *Philosophie der Werte*. And this because he boldly makes a sharp demarcation line between the theoretical and the æsthetic valu-

ation, and he does it so fully that even a psychological æsthetics with its conceptional constructions vanishes like a world of ghosts when seen from the standpoint of such really living valuation."

But the opponents of absolute values are certainly not confined to the circle of those who begin with the objects instead of the subjects. Those who are ready to interpret reality in voluntaristic spirit and to acknowledge the fundamental character of the purposive activity may yet insist that we can never transcend the relativism of personal interests. Some of the cleverest objections raised against the neo-idealism characterize the situation even as if we were again simply falling into the traps of the typical ontological arguments. The reality of God's existence was proved by the fact that we necessarily think of God. In the same way the reality of absolute values is now to be proven by the fact that we feel obliged to demand them. The ontological argument is thus simply moved from reason to will and the fallacies of the argument must remain the same. Yet this again is a complete misunderstanding. Whoever understands absolute idealism from its epistemological center must see that the analogy with the ontological proof does not hold in the least. Every beginner in the study of critical philosophy knows that our thinking can indeed never prove the reality of anything which lies beyond experience, but that on the other hand the form and connection of the experienced world is absolutely given by the conditions of our experiencing subjectivity. That which is necessarily postulated as constituting experience cannot be unreal in our possible experience. The same critique which once for all demolished the ontological argument has proved to us the absolute character of those relations in nature which are posited by the category of the understanding. If now it can be shown that the subject function by which the experience becomes constituted as an objective, existing world is ultimately will activity and that the same will activity constitutes besides this knowable world the æsthetic and the moral world: we certainly do not resuscitate the ontological argument, if we insist that the categories of this will determine absolutely the worlds of truth and beauty and morality.

Absolute idealism does not claim the absolute reality of the eternal goods for any world beyond our world of ethical, æsthetic and logical experience. It would not even have any possible interest in anything which is conceived as existing outside of the world of experience, inasmuch as such mysterious knowledge would have meaning only if we go back again to the precritical idea of existence. If an idealist were to fancy that those absolute goods were eternally existing things last-

ing through all ages, the absurdity would be hardly worth combating. The eternal values are not existing but are valid; they are not valid for a world beyond experience but for an experience which becomes a world only through the organizing activity of our will. Certain values must belong absolutely to the only possible world of ours, if it can be shown that the will which organizes the chaos of our reality into our world finds a world only in so far as those goods are realized. The whole effort of my idealism is to demonstrate that the deepest nature of our purposive activity involves a fundamental demand which must be fulfilled in order to find a world at all. Only in so far as experience fulfills this demand can we speak of a world, and therefore we have the right to presuppose *a priori* that those features which fulfill it hold eternally and absolutely for the only possible world of experience.

All our striving and seeking and pragmatic doing is thus determined beforehand by the absolute power of that which must have eternal validity for the building up of the real world, because it belongs to the world-building will itself. The individual and the social will which seek truth, beauty, morality and religion are therefore absolutely controlled by the overindividual demand of the general will to have a world at all. Whoever does not will to have a world but is satisfied with living through a dream and a chaos, cannot possibly enter into our discussion of that which is absolutely or relatively valuable in our world. On the other hand, he who seeks a world must find in that world a realization of all the various aspects which the fundamental will towards a world offers. It is the real labor of my book to show that those various aspects which we call truth and harmony and beauty and progress and law and morality and religion and so on are indeed only different aspects of that one fundamental demand. This proof, which I might claim to be an empirical proof if the word is rightly understood, is the essential new contribution of my book.

If the task is understood in this way, it is evident that the form of the rigid system is the only appropriate one. I know quite well that in the days of our impressionistic philosophizing the architecture of an exactly constructed system seems clumsy and pedantic. I know as well as my critics that life is full of transitions and does not know sharp demarcation lines and that every conceptional system seems to ignore the tints and shades of our real life; but I know still better that it is not the philosopher's task simply to live life, but rather to understand it and to bring order into the manifold. Those demarcation lines of the system are certainly artificial, just as the dimensions of

geometry are artificially selected; logical thought cannot dispense with them.

To be sure, all this involves that the organization of experience which we call beauty or progress or morality or truth be recognized by the idealist as an approach towards a definite ideal which can be deduced from the character of the overindividual will. Some pragmatists have denied that I have succeeded in showing such definite standards. Professor James in his recent essay, 'An Abuse of Abstractions' (*Popular Science Monthly*), where his finest fighting spirit turns his weapons against Rickert and me, insists that I have nothing to show but the general proposition that 'there is absolute truth.' The pragmatists, he says, articulately define the meaning of truth. They define even that which for their private purposes they call absolute truth. Truth absolute would be for the pragmatist an ideal of formulations towards which opinions in the long run of experience may be expected to converge. In short, in the midst of his individualistic account of truth he has at least a kind of social standard. It is evidently a standard similar to the economic standard for the market price. We misled idealists on the other hand do not know anything about the truth, but live simply in a naïve confidence that there exists an absolute truth without our ever being able to say of what it consists. It is here that my 'vicious abstractionism' becomes most apparent.'

I am afraid that the only thing which is really most apparent is that I did not succeed in the German edition of my book in making at all clear what the one hundred and fifty pages on the logical values meant to express. My only hope must be that the English version which enters more fully into the fallacies of pragmatism may make it clearer that such an objection stands in contradiction to every page of the book. I have discussed there the truth of natural science and of history, of logic and mathematics; in short, for every group of true judgments I have with the greatest possible carefulness shown exactly what constitutes the character of the specific truth and have demonstrated that all these particular forms have one common trait which has its origin in the fundamental structure of our world-positing will and is therefore binding for eternity on every individual who seeks truth. My whole discussion of knowledge, which forms an essential part of the book, is an effort to go beyond the mere statement that there is truth. This general truth, that truth if it exists at all is absolute, would even be worthless for the special purposes of my system which needs an answer for just that question, of what specific characteristics does

truth consist. That general proposition, 'there is absolute truth,' for me stands only as an expression of the minimum requirement for the truth-seeker. He who does not accept it, we idealists insist, negates himself, and we saw in that the very first fact which brushes aside all pragmatism and all relativism.

I repeat that we idealists are therefore no less interested in the psychological and sociological studies which make the truthseeking process the object of scientific analysis, and I for one should completely accept all the opinions of the pragmatists and positivists as long as they want to describe by their account a part of the history of human civilization and do not aim to give us a philosophy. Exactly the same holds, of course, for all those antagonists of eternal values who focus their interest on the ethical problems. They show us how all human doing is the satisfaction of individual interests, and how a social synergy sets in and how in the interests of moral economy the satisfaction necessarily more and more takes that shape which we call the moral life. But all such positivistic ethics, completely true as part of social psychology, again leaves out of account that which to the idealist is the only real problem, the meaning of duty. If our moral behavior is nothing but a more complex prudence, developed in order to satisfy the greatest number of individual interests, there is indeed not the slightest trace of any absolute value involved. But such an account simply ignores the fundamental question of ethics. How do I come to feel bound by demands for interests which are not my own? If I gave to this simply the psychologizing reply of the ethical pragmatist, I should explode every conviction of obligation. I can accept every word of such psychological logic and ethics, and yet stand exactly where I stood at the first page of my book, seeing all the real philosophical problems before me. The philosophy of truth and beauty and morality and religion can no longer be reached in our time simply by analyzing social phenomena and bringing them into axiological connections.

There must be no delusion. We simply must once more force on our present-day relativism the fundamental categories of critical philosophy: we must go back to Kant and from Kant to Fichte, unless we want to stop at the level of the eighteenth century. This does not mean that we ought to repeat the terms and externalities of those classical systems. Each time must make use of the progress which science and life have secured. We cannot return to Kant and Fichte without remembering what psychology and natural science have gained since their time. But the essential problems of true philosophy are unchanged.

This is not the party demand of a German for German philosophy. If an English biologist were demanding that we do not ignore the work of Darwin, it would not be a prejudice for British biology. Biologists may and must go beyond Darwin, but they cannot simply see things again with pre-Darwinian eyes and without answering the new problems at all. The critical philosophy is not German philosophy, it is rather *the* philosophy since the day that Kant performed for philosophy what Copernicus did for astronomy or Darwin for biology. We cannot simply look into the philosophical world with the eyes of Locke or Wolf; and yet that is again the fashion for too many here and abroad.

Back to Kant! Yes, we have courses on Kant in our universities, but usually they are courses against Kant, or rather against a caricature of Kant. The students leave them with a thoroughly superfluous knowledge of Kant's terms and classifications, together with either a condescending disapproval of his blunders or with a disgust at his absurdity. They have not the slightest idea of Kant's real problems; they have never lived through them, never seen them; they remain pre-Kantian as Spencer was or as Haeckel is or as the great majority of good people always will be.

There is no harm and much merit and charm in such brilliant discussions of truth and morality from an eighteenth century standpoint. For the practical affairs of the average man they are the most helpful and encouraging stimulations, and for the scholar they are highly valuable contributions to social psychology. Moreover, they can reach and aid much wider circles than the consistent investigations in critical philosophy which demand serious philosophical schooling and like higher mathematics can interest only a small number. Such discussions are much more to be recommended for the social organism. They are similar to the chemical innovations by which nowadays coffee without caffeine and tobacco without nicotine are brought to the market. He who sips and smokes these new-fashioned products ought to be glad to have them. They give him the pleasant feeling as if he were drinking coffee or smoking cigars, and yet they cause no discomfort to his nerves. But he must not think that he has there the real extracts of those curious plants when the decisive aromatic substances are eliminated. Logic without truth and ethics without duty and metaphysics without conviction and without absolute values have many advantages too. Only, again, he who sips them must not fancy that he has there the real extract from the leaves of the curious plant which we call philosophy.

KINDS OF VALUE OR CONSISTENCY.

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In his classic introduction to the *Microcosm* Lotze called attention to the wide chasm in modern life between labor and the things of the spirit, between science and appreciation, between economics and religion. In his *Studies in Logical Theory*, Dewey defines philosophy as a science of the method of experience, one of its chief problems being the relations of various kinds of reflective experience to each other, of science to esthetics, for example, and of both to economics, ethics and religion. No more important problem faces the philosophical critic of experience today, and we enthusiastically welcome the interest in it shown by some recent articles on meaning and value. Moore's discussion of Truth-Value,¹ that of Tufts on Ethical Value,² and that of Coe on Religious Value³ are timely contributions to this subject, while Dewey's review of James's *Pragmatism*⁴ and Montague's paper on The True, the Good and the Beautiful⁵ present the main problem and make important suggestions toward its solution.

Under the caption, 'What Does Pragmatism Mean by Practical' (the review of James's *Pragmatism*), Dewey points out that "meaning will itself *mean* something quite different in the case of 'objects' from what it will in the case of 'ideas,' and for 'ideas' something quite different than in the case of 'truth.' " "In composing 'these different points of view' into a single pictorial whole, the *distinct* type of consequence and hence of meaning of practical appropriate to each has not been sufficiently emphasized." Dewey finds in James the necessary formula for each of three distinct kinds of meaning, 'the conceptual connotation or definition of an object,' 'the denotative existential reference of an idea,' and 'actual value or importance.' Correspondingly, the term practical means either 'the attitude and conduct exacted of us by objects,' 'the capacity and tendency of an idea to effect changes in prior existences,' or 'the desirable and unde-

¹ *Journal of Phil., Psy., and Sc. Meth.*, V., p. 429.

² *Ibid.*, V., p. 517.

³ *Ibid.*, V., p. 253.

⁴ *Ibid.*, IV., p. 85.

⁵ *Ibid.*, VI., p. 233.

sirable quality of certain ends.' In the discussion of James's book Dewey notes a certain vagueness resulting from failure on James's part to clearly define in some cases just the kind of meaning of the term practical which he has in mind.

"Granting the right of the pragmatist to regard truth and beauty no less than goodness as forms of organic adjustment or equilibrium," Montague "would deny the conclusion that truth and beauty are therefore mere forms of goodness." "This new pragmatic method does not justify some of those who call themselves pragmatists in identifying or confounding together the types of value which we call the true, the good and the beautiful." The article is aimed at the humanists and especially, we take it, at Schiller, and Montague is perfectly justified in this criticism. The above statement assumes a definition of pragmatism which very few pragmatists will accept as even fair. Truth or logical value, the paper asserts, is the consistency of a particular judgment content with the total content of experience. The former must be 'harmonious with that general system of which it is a part.' This is to 'make the judgment accord with the environmental facts.' (To the present writer these two propositions do not mean the same thing at all.) The good, on the other hand, is a matter of conation rather than cognition. Conation is satisfied when its object conforms to it, while cognition is satisfied when it conforms to its object. The content of judgment or cognition is *given to* the individual, while desire or conation *springs from* the individual. "The environment presents its demands to the individual as facts, while the individual presents his demands to the environment as desires." When the former demands are satisfied we have truth; when the latter are satisfied we have the good. The conative attitude is prospective: the cognitive, retrospective. Beauty is the permanently, objectively and universally pleasurable. The distinguishing thing about beauty as a kind of value is that it is a harmony between the organism and the environment which is neither enforced by the latter upon the former nor achieved by the former over the latter, but found as something that simply happens.

Professor Dewey's classification is of course a very different matter from Montague's, so different that nothing but the fact that both deal with kinds of meaning and point out the necessity of making distinctions enables us to mention them together. Montague's assertion that the object of judgment or cognition is *given to* the judgment, the doctrine that the objective content of judgment is also the stimulus and given datum of the judgment process, is entirely inconsistent with

Dewey's position and also, as it seems to the present writer, with the facts of experience. Moreover, the object as the bearer of logical values differs in this respect, that is, in the matter of not being given to the judgment process, not at all from the object as the bearer of ethical or esthetic values. Montague seems to hold that objects enforce or determine judgment, whereas in Dewey's view objects exact, not judgments, but attitudes and conduct. From Dewey's standpoint that which controls is, by virtue of its control, objective, but the reverse proposition that the object controls and determines judgment is one against which much of his writing has been directed. The character of tending to produce changes in the world of fact, which Dewey ascribes to ideas, Montague ascribes to desire or conation. Their views as to the third type of meaning have nothing in common. The presupposition of Montague's paper, that according to pragmatism all values can be defined in terms of an adjustment between the organism and its environment, is incompatible with Dewey's whole position, unless we ascribe to these terms something radically different from their literal biological meaning. It is not important to our purpose that we discuss these papers here at length after indicating their tenor.

In Moore's paper it is held that "truth-value is not the satisfaction of a special instinct coördinate with the other instincts, but that it is the value of the entire experience of readjusting conflicting values through the process of redistribution of values effected by interaction with a wider and *relatively* more permanent range of relevant values." The author is 'painfully aware of the extremely general character of all this,' and proceeds to mention a long list of questions which the paper leaves unanswered. "We say in one breath that truth is a value belonging to judgment as such, and in the next we speak of ethical, esthetic and economic judgments. Does truth then belong only to one kind of judgments? Or are ethical, esthetic and economic judgments special forms of truth? Or are they all coördinate values belonging to every judgment? Or are they all stages through which every judgment passes? And if so, what determines these stages?" These are just the questions as to types and kinds of value which must come into discussion more and more, and it marks a stage of progress when questions are definitely formulated.

One of the obstacles in the way of mutual understandings and general advance is the ambiguity with which such terms as existence, meaning, value, fact and idea are used by different writers. Some speak of existence and value as varieties of meaning, fact being practically synonymous with existence and reality being a comprehensive

term for the entire universe within which these distinctions arise. Then there are the terms evaluation and importance, which possess a different connotation. The present writer fell into the practice of using the term consistency as the equivalent of value, meaning the tendency of reflective experience in all of its phases to keep up and maintain itself. Truth is a vague term, as are also beauty and the good. So many kinds of value are covered by each that it is next to impossible to use these terms in a classification of values. Consider, for example, the kinds of value represented by such terms as continuity or system, discreteness or exactness, thoroughness or totality, and by such heuristic principles as identity, conditionedness and conservation. Which of these is truth and, if all of them, how are they related to each other? Certain it is that they are essential or constitutive characters of any conceivable objective world. But in what order are they to be mentioned in the description of such a world? How are the principles of identity, conditionedness and conservation related to continuity, discreteness and totality? We may have a word to say concerning these questions in the sequel.

In Tuft's paper on 'Ethical Value' it is assumed that value is always attributive to objects of consciousness, and ethical value to objects of ethical consciousness. *The* object of ethical consciousness is conduct as expressive of dispositions which make the results of the conduct desirable to the individual. Ethical value is always rational and social, possessing intellectual as well as affective and instinctive elements. It is 'judgmental' and may by abstraction be both described and felt. On its volitional or intellectual side ethical value (1) implies at least a formal subject, active in the process of choosing or valuing—the only unqualified good is the 'good will.' (2) Ethical values refer to a system of ends, to a single standard of value. To economics 'all wants look alike,' but the world of morality is a unified whole in which various ends, each desirable in itself, require revision and reconstruction to become parts of a single personality. Hence the moral world has its law of contradiction just as the world of truth has. (3) Two *kinds* of choices characterize the moral world, namely, (*a*) that between the 'higher' and 'lower,' coinciding in part with the distinction between the more rational or ideal and the more immediate or sensuous, and (*b*) that between social and unsocial conduct. Ethical value implies the development of a rational or ideal and a social self. (4) Such a consciousness, in which choices and the agent of choice mutually determine each other, is one in which values are objective. It implies a moral order that is rational and social.

On its affective or emotional side, it has been held (1) that affective tone and ethical value are identical, (2) that there is a peculiar emotional tang or flavor which characterizes the ethical — sympathy, resentment, instinctive revulsion against what is 'low' and coarse, 'the feeling of ought,' etc., and (3) that there is nothing distinctive about the emotional or affective element in the ethical consciousness. Against the first view Tufts cites the objection of Plato and Aristotle that not pleasure but pleasure in right objects is ethical. The second or moral sentiment view has more to support it. For the higher-lower distinction there is probably some emotional basis in shame, disgust and contempt, while the social-egoistic distinction gets emotional color from sympathy and pity as these are fostered by sex feeling, parental feeling and sympathetic resentment. The feeling of ought or respect, and its opposite, moral enthusiasm or love for goodness, are more definitely related to ethical value, because they belong to the attitude in which something is presented as standard of action instead of being the outgrowth of one's own interests.

The paper goes on to mention four lines along which ethical values develop. (1) By rationalizing and socializing the elemental needs for food, shelter, and whatever maintains the life-process; (2) by the reflection of the individual upon group or class valuation; (3) from combinations of group or class valuation with emotional or utilitarian elements expressed in such terms as 'honor,' 'honestum' and the Greek 'kalokagathia'; and (4) by the emotional and instinctive recoil of the individual from certain acts whereby such conceptions arise as 'foul,' 'nasty,' and in part, 'impurity.'

Throughout this compact paper the fact is recognized that ethical values are rather demanded than constitutive of the world. They are neither given to nor anticipated by judgment. It is essential to them that they are simply and always demanded. And yet there are varieties of value in this field which are not always sufficiently emphasized. Take the distinction between the right (as distinct from the wrong), duty and the good, and the values represented by such heuristic principles as the moral maxim of Kant, the conception of the autonomy of the will, and that of a rational universe of conduct. We do not always appeal to these principles. Ordinarily, a conventional code, or other accepted standard, is applied. But when discrepancies arise between the various elements which compose such standards, it becomes necessary to revise and reconstruct them by reflection, and in such situations we resort to principles like these for guidance. A settled basis of organized habits is a presupposition of morality. Our

accepted, conventional standards of judgment are the formulations for these habitual points of view. But it is also essential to the moral life that it be in continual process of melioration to meet the ever-changing conditions of social life. The reflections through which this melioration takes place are under the control of an objective moral order founded upon such ideas of a moral democracy, the autonomy of the real will, or the maxim of the universality of ethical values.

In Coe's brief and very interesting paper on Religious Value, its double character is emphasized, namely, "its immanence in and partial identity with all values, and its transcendence of them as their ideal unity and consummation." "This double character gives rise to two opposed notions of religious value, one of which represents it as merely transcendent of other values, the other as merely immanent in them." On the one hand religion is said to deal with the spiritual rather than the material or sensuous goods; or with eternal rather than with temporal goods; or with reality as distinguished from phenomena, or with unity as distinguished from multiplicity." On the other hand, there is a tendency to identify religion with the esthetic, or ethical, or intellectual life. The paper concludes that "any kind of value may be a religious value, but only on condition of a certain inner self-transcendence whereby the particular value demands complete organization of itself with other values and ideally complete realization of the unitary whole." This implies the 'conservation of values' but only through the conservation of personalities. It implies also completeness of social value in an "ideal social being who satisfies, on the one hand, our desire to be completely understood, and on the other hand, our impulse to give ourselves in utter devotion to an object completely worthy of such ethical love." Religious value "is ethical value itself in its ideal completion and in union with all other values similarly ideal and complete." The sphere of religious value is social life and it differs from ethical value in that ethics of itself "takes into purview only a part of the social ideal that religion accepts."

All this seems to the present writer very near the truth. But religious value is neither identical with other values, nor is it merely more of the same kind as either or all of these. It is neither constitutive nor demanded of the world. Religious value is purposive without being deliberately so, and in this sense it is true that religion means the conservation of all values, as Höffding says. Esthetic and economic values are also purposive, but while esthetics represents the purposive aspect of the constituted and objective world, and economics that of the world of production and exchange, where values are de-

manded and imperative, religion has to do primarily with the purposive aspect of the entire life of purpose and conation. Attempts to identify religion with ethics or metaphysics or economics or social service leave the essentially religious demands of human nature unsatisfied and unexpressed. Ethical, esthetic and metaphysical elements are present in nearly all the conventional forms of religious worship, but they are not essential to it. One may be dissatisfied with all these, as for example in adolescent doubts, and yet be profoundly religious. He who doubts goes out like Abraham not knowing whither he goes, but he seeks a city which hath foundations whose builder and maker is God. He seeks that absolute uniqueness, perfection and individuality which are perhaps our most comprehensive experiences of value.

In a paper on 'Types of Consistency'¹ the present writer maintained that there are two types of value distinguished as habit is distinguished from accommodation. There is an organized and familiar type of values, made up of our established classifications and descriptions, which controls our judgments and also our attitudes and conduct under ordinary conditions. In dealing with new data we proceed deductively by first classifying the novelty and then proceeding to predicate of it all that is characteristic of the class. But when our 'established' classifications prove unsatisfactory and new data compel us to revise the fundamental conceptions upon which we have heretofore proceeded, whether it be in the realms of truth, beauty or goodness, we fall back upon a type of values which seems to grow right out of the nature of reflective activity. We lay aside for the time the technique which we have been accustomed to and proceed speculatively under the rubrics of wide-reaching heuristic principles until our technique has been reorganized.

Again, in different places we have tried to classify values into three groups, the constitutive, the imperative and the purposive, within each of which the two types of value spoken of above appear. For the content of each group it is certainly wise to adopt, so far as possible, a genetic classification. There is more than a mere analogy between the growth of the central nervous system and that of the mind. Secondary brain-centers overlie the primary and function as inhibiting and controlling influences in the life of the nervous system as a whole. Similarly, reflection overlies the simpler and more direct processes of immediate experience, its function being that of analyzing, reorganizing and so controlling immediate experience. There is such a thing as the experience of experience, and it does not characterize

¹ *Journal of Phil., Psych., and Sc. M.*, III., p. 457.

the lives of children and lower animals as it does adult human beings. It develops out of immediate experience and derives all of its materials from immediate experience. As it develops out of immediate experience the latter seems to unfold and differentiate into worlds of values which, in the observation of Lotze, are too widely separated in our modern life.

But how many? Values seem to be grouped already in both popular thought and scientific usage into three main systems which we might call the presentative, the motor and the purposive; and the adoption of some such tri-partite classification will consequently facilitate further work. But these distinctions of presentation, movement and purpose are characteristic of immediate experience as the psychologist analyzes it, and when immediate experience becomes reflective each of these characters becomes a tri-partite system, for reflection too is presentative, motor and purposive. Further reflection seems to indicate that the somewhat Kantian terms constitutive, imperative and purposive are more descriptive of the values within each group. The constitutive group will then include on the habitual side continuity or system, discreteness or exactness, and totality or thoroughness; and on the reconstructive side, such principles as identity, conditionedness or ground or sufficient reason, and conservation. The imperative group includes, on the habitual side, the right (as opposed to the morally wrong), duty, and the good; and on the reconstructive side, such principles as the moral maxim of Kant, the conception of the autonomy of the will, and that of a moral democracy or rational universe of conduct where real freedom is the possession and the characteristic of all. The purposive group of values will include, on the habitual side, art with its famous examples and conventionalized taste, economic institutions with their familiar and vastly significant laws, and individuality with its more or less conventional characteristics; and on the reconstructive side, esthetic taste pure and simple, the law of utility or want and its satisfaction, and absolute uniqueness or completeness.

Values seem to fall easily and naturally into some such system of groups and, while the names may be changed, some such classification seems to be comprehensive and desirable.

PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE.

URBAN'S VALUATION.

Valuation: its Nature and Laws. WILBUR MARSHALL URBAN.
London, Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1909. Pp. xi + 433.

The problem of value, the author of this book tells us, has two sides: a descriptive side which is concerned with the experiences of value as facts, and an appreciative side which is concerned with the evaluation of these experiences. The factual aspect calls into play a psychological interpretation of the phenomena; the appreciative aspect involves the 'axiological problem and method'—a problem and method which are connected with the grounding of values, that is, with their reflective evaluation. The relation of these two features of valuation—the relation of the psychological and the axiological problems—is considered in the introduction, and the conclusion to which the author's discussion leads is expressed in two aphorisms: 'no description without appreciation;' 'no appreciation without description.' The position thus indicated rests, in part, upon the rejection of that species of psychology of which Titchener's recent *Text Book of Psychology* may be taken as an example, and the acceptance of a functional view of the science. The method of functional psychology is said to be presuppositional—a method which 'begins with the analysis of presupposition' of the worth attitude (p. 14); and when the references of this attitude find their interpretation in a psychical continuity, and do not have to depend for this upon physiological dispositions, the method is said to become genetic. According to the genetic method "the progressive differentiation and correlation of the content of consciousness, by which new meanings are acquired and appreciatively distinguished, must be referred for explanation to functional readjustments of consciousness as an organic whole. Different levels of meaning are thus distinguished and transitions from one level to another accounted for" (p. 15). The references which the worth attitude makes—the meanings acquired in experiences of value—are of two kinds: they are either transgradient when the value refers a present feeling beyond the present state, or immanent when the value refers 'to something more deeply implicit in the present state' (p. 9). These distinctions play an important part throughout the book.

The genetic view of science implies a reading of phenomena in their total context. To lose contact with the environment is to make the genetic task impossible. Hence the 'worth experience is always an attitude,' that is, 'an immediate experience which contains in it a reference — in our terms, either transgredient or immanent — to presupposed psychical processes' (p. 14). Further consideration of this experience (Chapter II.) shows it to be a 'funded meaning (*i. e.*, a meaning acquired in the process of valuation) of the object for the subject in different attitudes, or as predetermined by different dispositions and interests' (p. 26). This statement implies two classes of inquiries: that which concerns the attitudes of the subject, and that which concerns the objects of these attitudes. These also are fundamental, and we give the author's conclusions. There are, he says, three fundamental attitudes of the subject: "(1) simple appreciation of the affective-volitional meaning of an object for the self; (2) the personal attitude, in which the worth of the object is determined by explicit reference of the object, whether a physical possession or a psychical disposition, to the self or alter, and in which characterization of (*i. e.*, the reference of value or worth to) the self or alter is presupposed, and (3) the impersonal attitude, in which the subject of the judgment is identified with an impersonal over-individual (*i. e.*, social) subject, and the value of the subject is determined by explicit reference to an over-individual demand" (p. 28). Objects of value are classified as follows: (1) objects of simple appreciation; frequently the author refers to these as 'condition worths,' that is, worths or values which have their basis in some modification of the condition of the organism; (2) objects of personal worth founded in the process of characterization of the person (self or alter); (3) objects of over-individual worth constructed in the processes of social participation (p. 30). If, in view of these distinctions, we ask what is the nature of the consciousness of value, we are told they are 'tertiary qualities' of an object, that is, funded (accumulated or stored) meanings predetermined by antecedent psychical processes, or, in brief, they are affective-volitional meanings. This view is defended against a narrower interpretation, and the 'feeling of value' is said to be "the feeling aspect of conative process, as distinguished from the feeling-tone of simple presentations. And by conative process we understand the total process of development by which affective-volitional meaning is acquired, the total process including actual (*i. e.*, affective) and dispositional (*i. e.*, conative) moments" (p. 54).

What now are the presuppositions of the worth experience? This

is, of course, the axiological problem as it relates to the consciousness of value. When we ask this question we are concerned with the cognitive implications of experiences of value. The author argues, correctly I think, that these are always some form or other of reality; value-feelings are characterized by the 'cognitive acts or attitudes which relate the object to the subject' (p. 41), and are not distinguished merely by the the objects of the feelings or by the causes of the feelings. Here the author follows Meinong, but parts company with him when this writer asserts that the presuppositions of value-feelings always imply judgments of existence and non-existence. Urban extends the references of value experience, in its cognitive aspects, to include, besides such judgments, what are called presumptions and assumptions of reality. Presumption is the acceptance or rejection of some reality meaning, and the condition which determines it is that it shall have 'recognitive meaning for a conative tendency' (p. 52). Assumption in its prejudgmental form is the acceptance of a subjective demand after arrest of primitive presumption, or taking an object as existent when there is a possibility of its non-existence. Here we have to do with what are called 'feelings of imagination.' Postjudgmental assumption implies dispositions created by acts of judgments, as, for example, values which attach to the general concepts, such as good, truth, virtue, etc. These are called 'feeling abstracts' or 'affective signs.' With judgment of reality there is acknowledgment or disavowal of certain control factors. Thus 'from primitive presumption arises, through arrest, assumption, which in turn passes into judgment and the later assumption' (p. 49).

In Chapter III. the modes of the consciousness of value are considered from the qualitative and quantitative points of view. From the qualitative standpoint, all worth experience has two modal characteristics — direction and reference. By direction is meant 'that fundamental duality of quality which, when feeling is viewed retrospectively as passive and as abstracted from conation, is described as pleasantness-unpleasantness' (p. 59). The presupposition of pleasantness and unpleasantness is an attitude of conation: they themselves are, however, feeling tones of presentational experience. In the realm of values they have no place; here we must speak of positive and negative direction. By reference is meant those 'aspects of feeling which refer to something presupposed, to a disposition already acquired for which the object has a meaning.' Transgredient reference is the sense of a subjective control leading on to other states (p. 60). Its dimensions, so to speak, are tension — restlessness — contraction (p.

67). Immanent reference is 'a sense of a more objective control leading to continuance or repose in some state' (p. 60). Its dimensions are relaxation — repose — expansion (p. 67). From these fundamental modes other meanings are acquired. First the primary acquired meaning of simple apprehension, that is, the appreciation of the affective-volitional meaning or worth of an object 'prior to explicit reference of the object to the ego or the alter or to other objects' (p. 68). At this level appear the 'impellant mode — feeling of obligation' (p. 68 f.), and the 'semblant mode — æsthetic feeling' (p. 70 f.). Besides these primary acquired, there are secondary acquired meanings, namely, acquired meanings of characterization, in which the reference of worth is to the personality (ego or alter); and acquired meanings of participation, in which similar desires and feelings in the minds of others are presupposed, giving rise to judgments and assumptions of over-individual (*i. e.*, social) demands (p. 71 f.). Quantitatively considered the consciousness of value must be studied with reference to its breadth or depth (p. 72 f.).

The next three chapters are of the nature of an interruption. This the author acknowledges (p. x) of Chapters IV. and V., in which the general psychology of the feeling experience is worked over systematically. I do not find, however, any reference to the *status* of Chapter VI., which arrests the argument for the purpose of studying and estimating the contribution of economics to the general theory of value. Why preferential consideration should be given to this one of the sources (pp. 3-6) of the author's theory of value as a means of determining the laws of valuation which apply to the entire range of worth experience, without giving the same kind and amount of attention to the other, does not seem, as a matter of method, to be sufficiently justified. Earlier statements (pp. 3 f.) foreshadow this preferential selection of economics. The usefulness of economics for the author's purpose consists in the fact that "there already exist certain formulations of such laws (of value), formulated for the specific purpose of economics," and "since these formulations *have been made*, although upon an inadequate knowledge of worth experience, and, therefore, have a definite place in worth theory, a critical examination of their foundations and the extent of their application constitutes our first problem" (pp. 142-143). If the selection of method is to rest upon this basis, why may we not go to, say, jurisprudence for our starting point, or to any other science which, as a matter of fact, has reached the formulary stage — ethics, æsthetics or religion? Because economics deals with a class of worth objects which is capable of more rigid and

fixed formulation, it presents certain advantages in the preliminary stages of the inquiry. But also for this very reason must one be on his guard against narrowing all worth experiences to the limits of this one. One must, even in the study of the typical formulations with which he begins, include material furnished by other types of valuation, if he is to avoid the fallacy of inconsequence. The question, therefore, I wish to raise is whether there is sufficient justification for basing the general laws of value on a special study of the laws of economic value, and whether, as a matter of method, it would not have been advisable to proceed immediately, without the intervention of Chapter VI., to the discussion of the different levels and degrees of value experience (Chapters VII. to XII.), and, thus, empirically to have developed and refined the laws of value through the deepening insight into the processes of valuation which cannot fail to come when the genetic method is applied to these value experiences. We should then be saved the appearance of having determined the laws before the phenomena had been subjected to critical analysis and estimation. Urban surely did not come to his formulation of the general laws of value in the way he seeks to lead the readers of his book; and there is one among his readers who has a temperamental preference for going over the original trail.

The problem of Chapter VI. is 'to examine the psychological laws of feeling and its modifications, developed for the purposes of economics, and to determine the extent of their application to other types and objects of valuation' (p. 144). These laws are 'laws of relativity of worth feeling' (p. 145), and are said to be three in number. There is (1) the law of the Threshold (pp. 146-155); (2) the law of Diminishing (or Limiting, cf. p. 158) Value (pp. 156-172); and (3) the law of Complementary Values (pp. 173-181). The law of the Threshold is "an expression of the fact that the power of an object to call out the feeling of worth, or the feeling of worth difference, depends not upon the object alone, but upon the feeling or conative dispositions of the subject as well . . . the question relates to the least quantity of an object which will produce a modification in the feeling of worth" (p. 146). The scope of the law is said to lie within an upper limit known as the 'existence minimum,' and which is a 'conceptual point at which absolute value passes over into relative value' (p. 148); value, in other words, becomes intrinsic (p. 150); and a lower limit which is the 'conceptual point at which the minimum of worth tends to pass over into worthlessness,' and here we have the 'final or marginal utility' (pp. 149, 169, 170). The law of Diminishing or Limiting

Value embodies "the conception that the satisfaction of desire or pleasure, when it is increased quantitatively, finally results in the loss of capacity of that desire (and with it the feeling) — and, therefore, in the movement of desire to new objects, and the formation of new dispositions" (p. 158). In this connection are discussed the more general laws of the dulling of sensitivity and of satiety (pp. 158-167), and the relations of the laws of value to these laws are considered. The law of the dulling of sensitivity, it is shown, is limited to sense feelings and what are called the redundancies of the feelings of value, while the law of satiety finds no application at all in the field of values. The general character of the law of Complementary Values consists in the fact that "the elements of a total group of objects or part-processes of a total conative process of consumption or acquisition, are so related to each other as to be *complementary*. In other words, when related to each other as elements in an individual whole, the value of the whole, the degree of satisfaction of the conative tendency presupposed, exceeds the value of the sum of the elements taken separately. The values in such processes are described as Complementary Values, and the objects toward which these feelings are directed are ideal objects" (p. 174). Psychologically interpreted this law is a form of the general law of conative continuity (p. 178). The acquired value of such a process "has as its object not the element, but a new object founded on the rearrangements of the elements" (p. 178), that is, they are 'founded objects,' and founded objects are now defined as 'form-qualities' appearing in a conative process. Three psychological laws of complementary values are pointed out and considered (pp. 179-181), in all of which the rearrangement of elements creates form-qualities which are the real objects of imputed or complementary value. They are (1) the law of contrast, according to which "an object of desire and feeling when contrasted with its opposite, or when its existence is contrasted with its non-existence, gets an imputed value which, by itself, it has not intrinsically or instrumentally" (p. 180); (2) the law of the total series, which states that "the ordering of objects of desire and feeling in graded series, or with certain relations of contrast and repetition, as for instance in rhythm, gives rise to an imputed value of the whole which is not a sum of the value of the separate elements" (pp. 180, 181); and (3) the law of the end feelings, which recognizes that "the worth of a series of elements is determined by the final moment of the series and its relation to the preceding moments" (p. 181). The significance of the whole discussion of the chapter, in the words of the author, "is to

be found in the fact that the psychological analysis of the different types of worth feelings, and the formulation of the laws of valuation based upon this analysis, give us the scientific concepts with which to interpret the concrete facts of valuation which our analysis will disclose" (p. 189).

I have sought to center attention on the first few chapters (I.-VI.) of this book because they form the basis not alone of the positions to which the author comes in his study of the several main types of value, but also because they are the foundation on which the author seeks to rest the new science of axiology. The next main section is given to a consideration of the different worth objects both in themselves and in their relations to one another (Chapters VII.-XII.). Values of simple appreciation (Chapter VII.), it is shown, are pre-axiological, in somewhat the same way as sense objects, in Baldwin's discussion, are pre-logical. They are sub-personal and sub-social feelings. They may, however, acquire implications of a quasi-ethical and quasi-aesthetical sort, and it is this fact that makes them the starting point of a movement in which the higher personal and over-individual values are acquired. The consideration of value-movements — movements in which new meanings are acquired — psychologically depends upon *Einfühlung*, a term which the author uses 'to designate the entire process (projection, imitation and ejection) involved in the activities of characterization and participation' (p. 235 and note), and in this usage it includes value-movements of simple appreciation as well (pp. 194-202). The problems connected with the personal and over-individual values are determined by this relation which *Einfühlung* has to all value objects (Chapter VIII.). The axiological aspect of these higher types of value are considered in Chapters IX. and XI., and Chapters X. and XII. apply to these values the general laws of value which were determined in the earlier part of the book. Chapter XIII. discusses certain synthetic problems, and Chapter XIV. is occupied with a statement of the bearings of the conclusions of the analytical section upon the axiological problem.

This work has wider interest for philosophy than that of its special subject. It touches directly or indirectly problems in current discussion, and forces to the front some that have not attracted much attention in recent times. As an example of the former, we may refer to the section on pragmatism (pp. 396 f.); and of the latter, the author's formulation of the axiological problem. There is one thing of which the author seems to be in no doubt with respect to his distinctive problem: namely, its unequivocal uniqueness. This

means also its undeniable modernness. Helps to get itself stated or to answer its questions, it not only cannot get but does not need from the ancient disciplines. Philosophy (metaphysics) and ethics are useless for assigned reasons (pp. 3 f.), and epistemology is quite 'too narrow' to include the axiological problem. Axiology is said to be the outcome, not of these, but of the evolution hypothesis and the struggle for existence, on the one hand, and the modern consciousness of the social problem on the other. From them has resulted, we are told, the consciousness of 'a new side of reality' (p. 2) — the world of values. And it is this world of values that the author, untrammelled with any overweighted reverence for historic names, has studied in these pages. His disregard of the past — I might almost have said unconsciousness were it not for a few incidental references and an effective and somewhat heavy draft upon Leibniz (pp. 395-428) — is delightfully irritating, and is sure to make some of our modern philosophers who know nothing but the past rub their eyes and wonder. Others, however, will be set to thinking, and, as a result, we shall perhaps be inquiring a little more carefully than has been our custom into the nature of philosophical problems and of the relations in which these stand to the genetic movement itself.

There are a number of psychological questions suggested by the reading of the book. The author has read discriminatingly the modern writers in this field, and he has made special use of the Austrian school. In his handling of psychological problems there is an irenic spirit which is distinctly promising. Yet, I think, one will question whether the Wundtian psychology of feeling which the author accepts (pp. 62 f.) has been successfully correlated with the functional view of consciousness, in his exposition of which the author comes so near to Stout. I presume we are involved at this point in the whole question of the nature of psychology, and especially whether the structural and functional views have any points of contact, or are capable of any sort of reconciliation (p. 63, note). Another question is the relation of hedonic intensity to increase in depth and breadth of value feelings. In the author's treatment, value feelings move in a positive and negative direction, and are said to vary independently of the hedonic accompaniments of the value experience, so much so indeed, that the psychology of valuation informs us of an intensity-less appreciation (pp. 106 f., 128 f.). It could be wished that a fuller exposition had been given to what is the precise nature of 'direction' as distinguished from 'intensity,' because it seems that it is the lack of distinctive characteristics here that leaves one in doubt as to the relations that direc-

tion bears to intensity. The broader question which includes this one is, perhaps, that which relates to the distinctive features of the various affective experiences which, commonly, we mark off by such words as feeling, emotion, sentiment, passion, etc.

Again, there is the problem of *Einfühlung*, which, in the words of the author, 'cannot be said to have reached a final solution' (p. 237). Of the fact for which the term stands there is, of course, no doubt. We do read into — or *feel into* — other objects experiences of which we have knowledge through our own immediate consciousness. The questions which psychology will be interested in concern the extent of this process, the nature of it, and the method of it. The author takes *Einfühlung* in a much broader way than has been customary (p. 235, note), to cover not only the processes lying at the foundation of the æsthetic experience, those, namely, to which Baldwin confines the term and which he calls *sembling*, but also those which are at the foundation of the ethical and moral life as well, those, namely, which the author has summed up under the terms *characterization* and *participation*. There is, doubtless, need of a distinctive term to cover the characteristic processes of the whole field of values in its psychological features, and if psychologists and others can agree upon the usage here indicated it will advance matters so far. But, fundamentally, there is the question of whether a common denominator can be found for these various experiences. In other words, it is a question of the extent of the process of *Einfühlung*. But the determination of the extent of the process must necessarily throw into the foreground the problem of its nature. Here the author's discussion of the relation of feeling and will to value feelings (Chapters IV. and V.) has a direct bearing (cf. especially pp. 83-95), and the reviewer thinks, with the author, that feelings of value must be considered as involving a two-fold functional relation within the total value experience, and that, consequently, they cannot be described as either feeling or conation, but only as affective-volitional or volitional-affective, depending upon which function is uppermost in the experience under consideration. Now, of course, the method of the establishment of such values is involved in the psychology of *Einfühlung*, and the psychological question becomes at this point, How is *Einfühlung* possible? (pp. 236-253). But all these psychological questions centering in the psychology of *Einfühlung*, rest back upon a more fundamental and distinctive problem — the problem of consciousness itself. The discussions of the past few years have done something not only in the way of centralizing this problem for the psychologist, but also of suggest-

ing possible lines of profitable inquiry. There still remains work to be done from the genetic standpoint, and although the present book has made some advances over previous writers, there are some questions which the author's discussions leave open. Urban does not take the social character of consciousness in a thoroughgoing way; and, therefore, when he raises the question, How is *Einfühlung* possible? he conceives its possibility as a means of bridging the gap between one individual and another. This is seen throughout his discussion of 'personal values,' which are individual values; and it does not suggest itself to him that the existence of such values is itself a problem of which axiology ought, if it is genetic, to give some account. If this prior question were considered, it might lead to a limiting of the scope of *Einfühlung*, and the position would approach nearer that of Baldwin and others.

The index gives but two references to religious values. According to the author religious construction, like the æsthetic, is concerned with the projection of social worth into ideal personalities; but the demand that religion makes for a completely over-individual object is, from the point of view of valuation, not borne out. All that can be allowed is that 'the personal and the impersonal values fuse in an intrinsic value' which, as immediate, is over-personal and over-social in its meaning. "But still it remains a personal value in the sense that it is only as a *practical* absolute, as the limit of a series of personal experiences, that it has axiological meaning and validity" (p. 348). It is to be hoped that the author will consider, at some future time, this class of values in the same patient and exhaustive way that is so characteristic a feature of his work.

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EMOTIONAL THOUGHT.

Psychologie des emotionalen Denkens. HEINRICH MAIER. Tübingen, Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1908. Pp. ii + 804.

One scarcely knows what to say of this really immense book of over 800 large and rather closely printed pages. The novelty of the problem, as well as its timeliness and importance, would tempt one to say that too much could not be written under this title, and yet the conclusion is hardly to be avoided that the book would have gained greatly by condensation. Surely everything ever thought or written, bearing even remotely upon the subject, has found its way into these pages (proof conclusive of long years of conscientious and labori-

ous work, but also, if one may say it without impertinence, of a temperamental inability to remove the smallest piece of scaffolding) — with the result that it is difficult to see the lines of the building, and with the further result, it is to be feared, that the author has condemned his own book to the limited audience of the most courageous.

But when these really serious criticisms are made — and they are made with all the greater reluctance because of the significance of the subject — the book may still be welcomed as the first attempt at a systematic presentation of a range of ideas which have as yet been more or less in a state of flux. "In the center of the discussion," he tells us, "is the thought that out of the emotional and practical side of the mind, out of the life of feeling and will, there develops a type of thinking which is effective in the ideal constructions of the affective imagination, in the world of purposes, norms, values and goods, and which appears most notably in æsthetic contemplation, in religious faith, in custom, law and morals." He thinks that he is able to show that "this thought, the elementary activities of which are to be found in the images connected with feeling and desire, takes its place, as a unique, independent, complete and unitary type of logical function, beside the judgmental type which belongs to cognitive thought." For some time such ideas have been in the air, such a logic of the practical reason has been a *desideratum*. Ribot has been striving to establish a logic of emotions; Meinong and his followers have been pointing in this direction with their investigations of the affective imagination and judgment; Baldwin has been preparing the way for such a logic in the first two volumes of his *Genetic Logic*. With all these Maier's work has affiliations, and with the first two relations of acknowledged dependence. His own special contribution consists in showing (in an exasperatingly detailed fashion to be sure, and yet in a way which well supplements the work of the others), that the entire 'categorical apparatus' of objectification is present in the affective and volitional processes, and that there is a conceptual interpretation of this objectified experience in value judgments, entirely analogous to the truth judgments of 'cognitive thought.'

The task thus contemplated is, as the title of the book indicates, in the first place psychological. And yet the inclusion of emotional thought (the author's general term for two sub-forms, *affective* and *volitive* thought) under a larger concept of logic, as well as the carrying out of the program outlined above, involves constant reference to logic and, indeed, the traversing of the whole field of logical lore. Here the professional logician will find the author entirely at home,

and will, moreover, I venture to think, find much that is fresh and of value from his own point of view — especially in the matter of the psychology and logic of speech, which plays such an important role in his discussion. It is true that the claim that these elementary activities of emotional thought are to be found in affective and conative images requires him to break completely with the fundamental assumption of modern logic, that the judgment is the fundamental logical function. But this is by no means entirely novel. The arguments by virtue of which he holds that the essence of even the most elementary cognitive judgment is the claim to truth; that truth always involves equivalence of a special type, equivalence of two ideal elements being present in the most primitive judgment; and that, finally, even the judgment of the existential type is not the most ultimate logical function — these have long been familiar in various forms, and to many conclusive. With this reconstruction of current logical conceptions, he is in a position to maintain that the claim to objectivity is present in the simplest processes of feeling and will, and that within the processes of presentation and imagination, as determined by desire, emotion and will, are fundamental acts of thought (*Denkakte*) which, while claiming neither existence nor truth, establish an objectivity of values in ethical, æsthetic and religious experience. These fundamental acts constitute the presuppositions (the presumptions and assumptions, so to speak) on the basis of which the more complex emotional logic of these spheres develops. The entire 'categorical apparatus' of objectification is, to use his own terms, pre-logical in the sense that it is prior to judgment.

It is not possible here even to suggest the way in which this program is carried out through over half the book. It may, however, be said that the completeness of the application of the purely analytical method which the author employs makes it admirably complementary to Baldwin's genetic proof of the same general conception. Nor can we delay to point out the interesting conclusions he draws with respect to the objectivity of æsthetic and religious experience. Turning directly to the more complex and developed types of emotional thought, we find that they are such forms of affective and volitive thought as arise when, on the basis of the fundamental acts of feeling and will, judgments of equivalence and of conceptual interpretation develop. Chief among these are the *value judgments* embodied in art and religion, in morality and law.

Maier devotes a special chapter to an abstract discussion of value judgments. Conformable with his doctrine that the elementary logical functions are not judgments, but *Substratdenkakte*, the value judg-

ment is, he holds, not primary, but derived. There is, it is true, a broader and a narrower use of the term value judgment. In a sense, in *all* feelings the objects corresponding to the affective images are implicitly valued; and to this extent valuation is presupposed in the elementary *Denkakte* of religious, æsthetic and ethical experience. But in the strict sense of the word, value judgments are concerned with values as they are explicitly thought; value judgments establish a conceptual relation between feeling and its object, and are therefore judgments of knowledge in the proper sense of that term. The writer of these paragraphs would gladly linger over the details of this discussion, especially the contribution to the reconciliation of the affective and voluntaristic theories of value, the treatment of this point, as well as of the general psychological question of the relation of feeling and will, being one of the best that have appeared. It must suffice, however, to suggest the important bearing of this definition of values upon the further development of the book. While the primitive acts of moral will, of religious faith, and of æsthetic intuition, have objectivity and emotional and volitive evidence, it is only the reflective value judgments that have elements of knowledge.

The division of emotional thinking into 'affective' and 'volitive,' according as the *Substratdenkakte* are embedded in feeling or desire, affords the basis for the main divisions of the work. Affective thought included the æsthetic and religious. Under the head of volitive thinking, the second main division, Maier discusses legal norms and principles and ethical thinking proper. These constitute the most highly developed forms of volitive thought, developed by judgments of equivalence and interpretation from the elementary volitive acts, desires, commands, requests, etc.

His analysis of the processes of abstraction by means of which the social and legal norms are developed, is one of the most suggestive parts of the entire work, and constitutes a real contribution to the reconstruction of the Philosophy of Right which is taking place under the influence of the psychological analysis of valuation. These norms, he is led to believe, are wholly hypothetical and derived. An examination of the nature of the subject of rights, of the ends which these norms as hypothetical imperatives serve, leads to a purely relativistic and positivistic conception of the most fundamental concepts of right (p. 740). In ethical thought proper, on the contrary, he believes we are led to deeper forms of volitive thinking in which there are absolute ends and values. A critical examination of various ethical theories, as well as an analysis of the ethical facts themselves,

brings him to a form of Eudæmonism based upon a necessary intuitionist assumption. Ethical desires stand in the closest relation to the instinct of self-preservation, the fundamental volitive *Denkakt* being what he describes as *Ichwille*, an absolute element without which the characteristics of ethical thought are inexplicable. Out of this element, through processes of volitive abstraction, develops the *Persönlichkeitswille*, and the entire system of ends and norms which it embraces. While much of the content of the ideal personality is recognized as social, Maier's ethics has a decidedly individualistic tone.

Enough has been said to indicate the main tendency of the book, as well as the points at which suggestive elements are to be found. In the main it is psychological and positivistic in character, with an underlying voluntarism which finds expression in the main conception that in the most elementary processes of desire and feeling there are fundamental acts of objectifying thought, out of which develop the more complex types of ethical, æsthetic, religious and legal thought. The chief epistemological or axiological conclusions are negative rather than positive. In none of these spheres, the author holds, is the evidence cognitive and the value a truth or existence value. Throughout the various chapters there are scattered discussions of these various kinds of evidence and validity, but one misses sadly a concluding chapter in which these threads might be drawn together in a general discussion of the relation of value to fact and truth. For this one would gladly sacrifice much of the tedious historical discussion, for with the best will in the world it is but an obscure pattern that one gets by piecing together paragraphs scattered here and there. But despite these defects of construction, the book may be safely recommended as a source from which many elements for the future development of this fascinating subject will inevitably be taken.

W. M. U.

HUMAN VALUES.

I Valori Umani. F. ORESTANO. Turin, Bocca, 1907. Pp. viii + 300.

This recent issue of the Bocca Library of Modern Science fully sustains the traditions of a series which has already attracted attention by its publication of translations of Nietzsche's works and of other books of a more scientific character but equally modern tendency, such as those of Harnack, James and Verworn. In addition to its intrinsic interest, it has the further merit of being the first attempt in Italy to establish that specific field of investigation which alone meets in a

scientific fashion, and therefore in a manner likely to do justice to its problem, interests which have become dominant in the modern mind. In introducing the theory of value to Italian readers, Orestano is not unmindful of his unique opportunity, and in his Introduction he traces the historical stages by which the problem of values and evaluation has appeared in the precise and dominating form in which it presents itself to-day. The relation of his own book to the general movement being what it is, he has not hesitated to make it in large part a presentation and criticism of those works, mainly German (of Meinong, Ehrenfels, Lipps, Krüger, Eisler, Höffding, and Cohen) by which the movement is represented. The original element in his contribution is the skillful manner in which he makes this criticism contributory to such an exact definition of the fundamental concepts of value as will, it is hoped, make the theory fundamental for the ethical and social sciences.

The aim of the book determines its form. The question, to what extent we have the definiteness of material and precision of concepts necessary for a general theory of value, is followed by the second more specific question of the possibility of founding a science of ethics on this basis. Accordingly, the work falls into two main divisions, the first consisting of a critical study of the chief theories and conceptions, ending in his own definition and classification of values; the second being devoted to a similar study of the chief theories of ethical values, concluding with his own views on the subject.

Orestano's general point of view is definitely scientific and positivistic rather than philosophical and systematic. Have we in the concept of value a formula comprehensive and definite enough to enable us to resume all the phenomena of social and moral experience in a manner similar to the employment of the concept of force in physical science? It is this idea that directs his critical studies; and his answer is affirmative — that is, in case we define value properly. From this point of view, it is true, he finds the purely psychological definitions insufficient. To define value in terms of feeling or desire or *Einfühlung*, is to define it too narrowly, in terms of a single element. The fault of these definitions is not, however, that they are psychological, but that they are *wholly* so. He does not react from the psychological point of view and find the criteria in logical or ontological definitions. He seeks instead a concept that, in the philosophical slang of the present, has 'thickness' rather than 'thinness,' that has contacts with all the sciences of vital phenomena. The problem is to find a concept that is fundamental to all these psychological vari-

ables. This *desideratum* he discovers in the concept of *interest*, *i. e.*, interest in the genetic, bio-psychological sense. "Value is the consciousness of interest in so far as it is connected with the object by which it is produced." The consciousness of interest is, to be sure, in the first place a psychological and subjective state, but it expresses the dispositions, actual or latent, both of mind and of body, of the individual and the race. Value is a vital phenomenon appearing under a psychological form.

The classification of values under the general concept of interest is not the least suggestive and well worked-out part of this section. Economic value is interest called out by the conservation of life; intellectual value, interest experienced by the subject for his cognitive activities as such; æsthetic value, interest not associated with an actual practical end; religious value, the interest we have in an ideal order perpetuating the fundamental values of life. Finally, moral value is determined by "the relation of a particular object in which one is interested with the fundamental concept, implicit or explicit, that one has formed of *life*, in the totality of the ends which it embraces" (p. 288).

Thus the moral values correspond to a unique interest and have a unique place in the system of values. They are concerned with valuations of a higher order, or rather with evaluations of the other values. The preceding definition follows upon a criticism of the various attempts to define moral values, in which the difficulty throughout is found in the tendency to identify ethical values with single concrete ends and interests. For Orestano, on the contrary, they are purely formal and their evidence logical, in the sense that all moral evaluations are deductions from the general concept of life which each has formed for himself. Thus, he holds, we are to explain the varying emphasis of ethical theories upon personality and law, obligation and sanction, etc. A purely functional and regulative conception of morality is the necessary outcome of his conception of valuation as a résumé in the psychical world of the subconscious forces of life.

Orestano maintains this positivistic and formal attitude throughout. For the rest, his position is well indicated by his attitude toward certain of the critical questions of the theory of value. He is, for instance, quite free from the banal prejudice that any psychology of values necessarily involves hedonism. His concept of ethical values takes him beyond the equally banal preoccupation with the alternative of egoism or altruism. On the question of absolute values, his principles lead to negative conclusions, except for his admission of the possibility of

practical absolutes in the sense that there are certain objects of such a nature as to call out a *constant* interest on the part of an individual, and to which he subordinates all others. As to absolute and universal values, in the sense that there are objects capable of calling out constant interest on the part of all men, only experience can decide.

It is in his treatment of the problem of the objectivity of values, perhaps, that he leaves most to be desired. He is confident that the principle of interest solves this question, — takes us beyond subjectivity. There can be no doubt that this definition has much to recommend it. On its psychological side, it does, as indeed others have shown, combine the active and passive sides of feeling and desire, and thus unify the psychological definitions of value. But interest is an unstable concept, and as equivocal as unstable, with one eye on the biological world, as Orestano has shown, and the other — is it not on the ontological world? No less equivocal and unstable is the concept of 'life' as readers of Guyau (by whom the author seems to have been greatly influenced) have long seen. It is only, as the author himself recognizes, in the possibility of passing beyond the biological conception of life, that sense is given to the element of absolute sacrifice in morals. But when we pass beyond the retrospective concepts of biology, in what regions shall our prospecting for the foundations of the ideal be carried on? To this question the book scarcely gives an adequate answer.

W. M. U.

VALUE AXIOMS.

Studien zur Wertaxiomatik. THEODOR LESSING. Archiv für systematische Philosophie, 1908, Bd. XIV., 1, 2.

These articles are especially worthy of notice, if for no other reason than that they are an extreme illustration of both the method and the outcome of the anti-psychological tendency in the theory of value. Written avowedly under the direct influence of Husserl's epistemological conceptions, they seek to maintain in the sphere of valuation that same logical purity which has condemned older members of the philosophical family to an unfruitful virginity. As Husserl would define logical laws as purely ideal and in no sense laws of actual thought activity, so Lessing would see in the laws of valuation purely ideal laws unrelated to empirical feeling and will.

The laws of valuation are laws of 'richtige Wertrangierung.' Themselves empty universals, they can never be principles of motivation but merely of measurement and regulation. On the analogy of

pure logic, 'reine Wertlehre' seeks *forms* of value — of differences, summations and contrasts — relations that are universal, and of which it is possible to say *a priori* that to so value, wish, or will, is to value, wish, or will rightly, *überhaupt*. What these empty universals are, Lessing finds some difficulty in formulating abstractly; but in so far as they find expression in empirical valuation, they are those formal principles of preference involved when we estimate objects, (a) according to the number or sum of the value-elements; (b) according to the order or relation of the elements; (c) according to their intensity or strength.

With regard to these formal categories, it is evident, so Lessing holds, that their further specification can lead only to general psychological laws. It is similarly evident that as soon as we leave the sphere of pure forms and pass to actual valuation certain antinomies emerge. An 'ideal worth-consciousness,' one in which the ideal laws worked purely, unaffected by psychological motives, would, it is true, be without worth conflicts; but owing to tendencies of purely empirical origin, we lay the accent now on one of these principles, now on another. As an illustration, we have what he calls the antinomy of 'axiological height and breadth,' between intensity and extensity of values; and one also which appears in the law of Marginal Utility, which is of course, on his view, not a law of valuation at all, strictly speaking. All the historical types of ethical theory, the individualistic and the universalistic or socialistic, the utilitarian and the eudæmonistic — all with any content to them, are the results of accentuation of one or other of these categories, due to historical or psychical tendencies, and are shot through with contradictions. Lessing's chief interest is ethics; and to his mind these antinomies mean the shipwreck of all teleological ethics. The break-down of the Kantian morality, with its logical squint (one eye on the transcendental categories, the other on the sphere of specific empirical content) indicates the immanent Janus-nature of all such ethics.

Lessing does not hesitate to undertake the task of describing the 'ideal conscience,' for the right ordering of empirical ends, in which the categories would work purely. One cannot say that he is successful. It is too complicated to be recognized, still less to be convincing. Somewhat more encouraging is the merely empirical ideal which he allows us, in our weakness, to substitute for the ideal conscience. Laws of valuation are, as we have seen, in no sense constitutive of ends or values. All such empirical content is derived from the *wertfrei* sciences of psychology, anthropology, etc. A 'will to value,'

however defined, is a monstrosity. And yet some concrete end we must have. Here it is: corresponding to the theoretical ideal of "creating logical dispositions the undeceptive character of which we may bring to consciousness at every step" is the "ethical ideal of the practical sphere, to create instinctive natures, dispositions and moral characters, the undeceptiveness of which, in so far as they do the right spontaneously, they make clear at every step."

Any criticism of this curious logical somersault into the crudest psychological intuitionism is here out of place. One may, however, be allowed to suggest that such a union of empty universals and instinctive natures, even if it does away with the reproach of unfruitfulness, is as likely as not to give birth, as in the past, to practical and moral monsters.

W. M. U.

ÆSTHETIC SENTIMENTALISM.

Le nouveau sentimentalisme esthétique. CH. LALO. *Revue Philosophique*, November, 1908, pp. 441-476.

This article contains, first, an exposition of *Einfühlung* as an æsthetic doctrine and, second, a criticism of it from the intellectualistic standpoint. The 'new sentimentalism' is the revival of the doctrine that 'feeling is the organ of beauty, and the conception of *Einfühlung* is its central point.' The term *Einfühlung* is untranslatable, but the author gives as paraphrases 'a kind of sympathy,' 'a projection of the self into objects,' 'the objectification of our affective life,' 'the identification of subject and object through the feelings.' Lipps and Volkelt are foremost among its advocates, and Karl Groos, Konrad Lange, Jonas Cohn, Paul Stern, Witasek and Dessoir are also mentioned among its supporters. The author traces the history of the term and of the conception for which it stands. He discusses the relation of *Einfühlung* to sympathy, to 'interior imitation,' to organic sensation, to association, to symbolism, to affective life, and to intellectual activities; in these discussions his starting point is a doctrine of some supporters of the *Einfühlung* theory. Needless to say they do not always agree among themselves, but they have this in common that they attempt to make *Einfühlung* fundamental and to show that other theories are simply subordinate elements in their doctrine.

In his criticism of this doctrine, M. Lalo raises three questions: (1) Has the objectification of affective life a fundamental role in æsthetics? (2) Has the *Einfühlung* conception a true explanatory value, or is it a confused notion? (3) Does its philosophical significance rest upon acceptable principles?

In other words, what is the æsthetic, the psychological, the philosophical value of this form of the sentimentalism?

With regard to the first, he insists that, though it may be true that there is such an objectification of affective life, it is not an exclusive possession of the æsthetic experience, since perhaps the best examples of it are to be found in the animal forms of pleasure and pain. Moreover, the intensity of the projection is not a measure of the æsthetic value of experience; witness the rustic's experiences in seeing a play. Once more, complete objectification and identification with all that is contained in a drama with its many diverse characters, or in a museum, is quite impossible, but still æsthetic pleasure may be present. *Einfühlung* is not a notion, he concludes, which is adequate to explain the æsthetic character of the facts.

The second question also he answers in the negative; the conception suggests problems but solves none; its advocates disagree among themselves and the conception itself is confused. It is "internal imitation with no model, a symbol representing nothing but him who thinks it, an exteriorization of our sensibilities which creates within us new sensibilities of which we were incapable without it, a height and depth of affective life which excludes the highest and deepest sensible impulsions," and so on. In short, M. Lalo regards the *Einfühlung* theory as the eternal 'je ne sais quoi' erected into a principle of explanation. He cites various distinctions made by its advocates which he regards as artificial and charges that the alleged irreducibility of *Einfühlung* is the pretext for a lazy philosophy, while its "obscurity, a convenient refuge for an art criticism too conscious of its weaknesses, is, for the psychologist, merely a sign of insufficient analysis, and, for the logician, of insufficient explanation."

Its philosophical value is, in his opinion, quite as small. "The philosopher can see in the *Einfühlung* only a first step towards mysticism, and the rejection of every possibility of rational and scientific explanation." Volkelt's contention for the irreducibility of certain mental factors involved in *Einfühlung* is the principal object of this criticism.

In the experience described as *Einfühlung*, states usually subjective are objectified. Ordinarily the objectification of mental states is determined by utilitarian conditions, but in this case it is the technique of an art which brings it about. So says our author, and he concludes that the object of study should be this technique and not an alleged irreducible feeling of personality objectified in the object. This last is, he holds, quite fruitless as a principle of explanation or description. Here speaks the author of *L'Esthétique expérimentale contemporaine*.

He is from the beginning of the article obviously hostile to everything smacking of 'le sentimentalisme' and not less so if it chance to be 'le sentimentalisme allemand.' There is point in most of his criticisms, but exception might be taken to his practice of attacking the form of the doctrine held by Volkelt or some one else and seeming to regard the result as a victory over the doctrine generally. Its advocates do disagree, and there is still much vagueness and uncertainty about the meaning of the conception. If he means to say that its supporters have not yet shown that it is an adequate description and explanation of all the facts, most readers would agree. But is every form of subjectivism to be condemned? There would certainly seem to be room in æsthetics for a description of the æsthetic experience in terms which might not be further analyzable, and also for a thoroughgoing study of the technique of the arts as furnishing the objective conditions for this experience.

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NOTES AND NEWS.

THE following changes have recently occurred at German universities: Professor Benno Erdmann has been called to Berlin to the chair left vacant by the death of Professor Paulsen. Professor Oswald Külpe has succeeded to the chair at Bonn and will found a psychological laboratory there; Dr. K. Bühler, his assistant and Privatdozent, accompanies him. Professor Karl Marbe has been called from Frankfort to Würzburg to the chair and laboratory directorship. Professor E. Meumann has succeeded to the chair at Halle left vacant by the death of Professor Ebbinghaus. Professor Ebbinghaus' successor as editor of the *Zeitschrift für Psychologie* is Professor F. Schumann, of Zurich.

PROFESSOR E. C. SANFORD, of Clark University, has been chosen to succeed the late Carroll D. Wright as president of Clark College.

A. B. SUTHERLAND, Ph.D. (Chicago), has been appointed assistant in psychology in the Government Hospital for the Insane at Washington.

THE present number of the BULLETIN, dealing especially with the Psychology of Value, has been prepared under the editorial care of Professor W. M. Urban.